1. ) Siti Mariam Binti Haji Samat [Menyaman Melalui Wakil Litigasi Yang Sah Iaitu Nazariah Binti Abbas, No. K/p: 610104-10-6626] 2. ) NAZARIAH BINTI ABBAS 3. ) MARLIA BINTI ABBAS v 1. ) NOR RAFIDAH BINTI ABBAS 2. ) NOR ISMAN BIN ISMAIL (No Pendaftaran Badan Peguam: BC/N/839) (Disaman sebagai rakan kongsi Tetuan Rizal & Hafez) 3. ) TETUAN RIZAL & HAFEZ (berniaga/beramal sebagai firma guaman Peguambela & peguamcara cawangan Ampang) 4. ) PENDAFTAR HAKMILIK WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR 5. ) P...

Case Significance

Illustrates that judgment in default of pleading is not entered as of right on a defendant's failure to file a defence, the court retaining a discretion to refuse it, particularly where public authorities are joined as defendants in a land dispute.

This High Court decision in Kuala Lumpur concerns an application for judgment in default of pleading against two government defendants in a land dispute, and the discretionary nature of such relief. The plaintiffs — a registered proprietor of a share in land at Setapak, suing through a litigation representative, together with two co-plaintiffs — had brought a writ action against several defendants, including an advocate sued as a partner of a law firm, the firm itself, and, as the fourth and fifth defendants, the Registrar of Titles for the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and the Director of the Land Office. The application in question, made under Order 19 rule 7 read with Order 91 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012, sought judgment in default of defence against the fourth and fifth defendants on the basis that they had failed to file a defence to the writ and statement of claim. The Court examined whether default judgment ought to be entered as of right in these circumstances. Drawing on authority including Alloy Automotive Sdn Bhd v Perusahaan Ironfield Sdn Bhd and Overseas Investment Pte Ltd v O'Brien, it treated the entry of default judgment as a matter for the court's discretion rather than an automatic entitlement, particularly having regard to the nature of the claim and the position of the public authorities joined as defendants. Being unpersuaded that this was an appropriate case in which to grant the relief sought, the Court dismissed the application with costs. The decision illustrates that a plaintiff faced with a defendant's failure to plead does not obtain judgment in default automatically, and that the court retains a discretion to refuse the application where the circumstances, including the involvement of public authorities in a title dispute, do not warrant it. The Court's approach underscores that the default-judgment procedure is not a trap that converts a mere failure to plead into an automatic entitlement, and that a plaintiff seeking such relief must satisfy the court that entering judgment without a trial is just in all the circumstances of the particular claim.