1. ) MARK SAW KHAY LIANG 2. ) CHARMAINE SAW CHIN PUAY v ANDREW SAW KHAY CHI

pa-22ncvc-60-03-2021 High Court (Mahkamah Tinggi) 3 November 2025 • PA-22NCvC-60-03/2021 • 44 min read
11 cases cited (0 SG, 11 foreign)

Outcome

For these reasons, I dismiss Mark and Charmaine’s (the Plaintiffs’) claim. And I allow Andrew (the Defendant’s) counterclaim at prayers 56.1 and 56.3, which are for— (1) a declaration that the 2017 Will is the valid will of the late Saw Eng Loke @ Saw Eng Lock, which has revoked all his earlier wills; (2) an Order that probate be granted for the 2017 Will of the late Saw Eng Loke @ Saw Eng Lock.

Quoted verbatim from the judgment of High Court (Mahkamah Tinggi) (pa-22ncvc-60-03-2021). Read the full judgment on the official Malaysia Courts portal for the complete decision.

Catchwords

1. This suit is about two Wills. The deceased testator (Father) wrote a Will in March 2014 (2014 Will). Under the 2014 Will, Father bequeathed (gave) the family home at No. 1 Jalan Scott, Penang, as well as his watches and jewellery to his younger daughter: the Second Plaintiff (Charmaine), and his residuary estate (the rest of his assets) to his wife (Mother). 2. But if Mother predeceased (died before) him, Father gave his residuary estate to his four children in equal shares. 3. The other three children are the First Plaintiff: the elder son (Mark), the Defendant: the younger son (Andrew), and the elder daughter: Samantha, who is not a party to this suit. 4. In this suit, the most pertinent asset is Father’s 20,000 shares in the family’s company: Tai Chuan Realty Sdn Bhd (Tai Chuan). These Tai Chuan shares are a part of Father’s residuary estate. 5. Under the 2014 Will, if Mother predeceased Father, then Father’s 20,000 shares in Tai Chuan would have been shared among the four children equally. Each of them would have inherited 5,000 shares. 6. Mother passed away in July 2014. 7. Later, in 2017, Father wrote another Will (2017 Will). The 2017 Will was different to the 2014 Will. Under the 2017 Will, the family home was still given to Charmaine. That has not changed. But the watches and jewellery were given to Mark and Andrew. 8. More importantly, Father’s 20,000 Tai Chuan shares were specifically given to Andrew only. This would make Andrew the single biggest shareholder in Tai Chuan among the siblings. 9. This change in Father’s Will is the subject of Mark’s and Charmaine’s grievance. 10. Mark and Charmaine sue Andrew— (1) to declare the 2017 Will invalid and to have it revoked; (2) to declare the 2014 Will valid and enforceable, and for probate to be given for it; (3) for damages. 11. Andrew counterclaims against them— (1) to declare that the 2017 Will revokes the 2014 Will; (2) for probate to be granted for the 2017 Will; (3) to remove Mark and Charmaine as executors of the 2017 Will. The three of them are co-executors. This prayer is no longer at issue, as it was dropped (withdrawn) at trial. (4) for Andrew to be appointed the sole executor under the Will (which it also dropped, and hence not at issue). 12. The question that will determine this suit is: Is the 2017 Will, Father’s valid and enforceable last Will?

Practice Areas

Judges (1)

Counsel (8)

Parties (3)

Case Significance

Illustrates the assessment of testamentary capacity under the criteria in Banks v Goodfellow in a contested probate action between siblings, the court upholding a later will that redistributed the family company shares and admitting it to probate over an earlier will.

This High Court decision concerns a probate dispute between siblings over the validity of two wills made by their late father, and it turns on testamentary capacity and the validity of the later will. Under an earlier will, the father left the family home and his watches and jewellery to his younger daughter and his residuary estate to his wife, with a substitutionary gift dividing the residue — including 20,000 shares in the family company — equally among his four children if his wife predeceased him; the wife did die first. Some years later the father made a further will, which kept the gift of the family home to the younger daughter but gave the watches and jewellery to his two sons and, most significantly, gave the whole of his 20,000 shares in the family company to the younger son alone, making him the largest shareholder among the siblings. The elder son and the younger daughter, as plaintiffs, sued the younger son to have the later will declared invalid and the earlier will admitted to probate, while the defendant counterclaimed for the later will to be declared valid and admitted to probate. The determining question was whether the later will was the father's valid and enforceable last will, which turned on his testamentary capacity assessed against the classic criteria in Banks v Goodfellow. After a six-day trial in which the plaintiffs called treating doctors and a nurse as witnesses of fact, and the defendant called the lawyer who had prepared and witnessed both wills, the court was satisfied that the father had the requisite testamentary capacity when he made the later will. It accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs' claim and allowed the defendant's counterclaim, declaring the later will valid and revoking the earlier wills, and granting probate of it, with costs of RM100,000 to the defendant. The judgment illustrates the assessment of testamentary capacity in a contested probate action.

On what basis did the court uphold the later will?

The court held that the determining question was whether the later will was the testator's valid and enforceable last will, which turned on his testamentary capacity assessed against the criteria in Banks v Goodfellow; after hearing the treating doctors, a nurse and the lawyer who prepared and witnessed both wills, it was satisfied that he had the requisite capacity and upheld the later will.

What orders did the court make?

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim, allowed the defendant's counterclaim by declaring the later will the valid last will that revoked the earlier wills, and ordered that probate be granted of it, with costs of RM100,000 to the defendant given the six-day trial and the claim and counterclaim.

Statutes Cited

Probate And Administration Act 1959
s 34

Cases Cited (11)

MY (11)
[2002] 3 AMR 3703 [2002] 4 CLJ 90 [2002] 4 MLJ 97 [2004] 4 CLJ 309 [2004] 6 AMR 781 [2005] 2 MLJ 1 [2016] AMEJ 2304 [2016] MLJU 1599 [2020] 4 MLJ 581 [2020] 5 AMR 541 [2020] 7 CLJ 137

Judgment

Read the full judgment on the official Malaysia Courts portal.

Read on eJudgment

Source: eJudgment (pa-22ncvc-60-03-2021)