1. ) BOBSON ONG DIN KOK 2. ) ONG DINSON 3. ) POH KOK ANN 4. ) POH THIAM KAR 5. ) POH THIAM SEONG v 1. ) TETUAN IVAN HO & ASSOCIATES 2. ) IVAN HO TIONG YIN 3. ) KENNETH GODFREY GOMES 4. ) TETUAN SABARUDIN OTHMAN & HO 5. ) CYNTHIA YONG MON TING 6. ) TETUAN LEE SHARON & ASSOCIATES 7. ) PUBLIC ISLAMIC BANK BERHAD 8. ) HAU MUN MENG 9. ) LEE CHEE HUENG

Case Significance

Illustrates when a cause of action accrues for limitation purposes, on the crystallisation of actual damage rather than the exhaustion of appeals, and the interaction of the Limitation Act 1953, res judicata and the absence of a duty of care to adverse parties in a striking-out application.

This High Court decision at Kuala Lumpur is a consolidated ruling on five striking-out applications in a professional-negligence and fraud claim arising out of a 2015 land purchase. The plaintiffs had bought land for RM4 million and later discovered a caveat alleging fraud; after losing an earlier suit in which the High Court declared their title null and void in March 2019, a decision affirmed on appeal, they brought the present action in May 2025 against their own solicitors, the vendor's solicitors, the bank's solicitors, and the vendor's directors. The court held that all the claims were time-barred under the Limitation Act 1953. It held that the cause of action accrued when actual damage crystallised in the High Court's adverse judgment in March 2019, not in April 2024 when the Federal Court dismissed leave to appeal: the six-year period under section 6(1)(a) had expired in March 2025, and the three-year extended period under section 6A had expired in March 2022. The fraud claim under section 29(1)(a) was likewise barred, discovery having occurred at the latest by the March 2019 judgment, if not in February 2016 when the caveat was found. Following Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Kamarstone Sdn Bhd, the court rejected the argument that limitation was suspended pending the appeals, holding that time runs from the earliest actionable moment. It further held that the claims against the vendor's directors were barred by res judicata, having been litigated in the earlier suit, and that the claims against the vendor's solicitors disclosed no reasonable cause of action, since, on Pushpaleela, they owed no duty to adverse parties. The court struck out all the claims as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. The judgment is a useful illustration of when a cause of action accrues for limitation purposes and of the interaction of limitation, res judicata and duty of care in a striking-out application.