Teo Ah Ai v Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam PIHAK TERKILAN Majlis Peguam

Case Significance

Illustrates the requirement to exhaust the internal disciplinary avenues under the Legal Profession Act 1976 and the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2017 before invoking the court's jurisdiction, and the treatment of a premature originating summons as an abuse of the process of the court.

This High Court decision at Kuala Lumpur concerns an originating summons arising from disciplinary proceedings against advocates and solicitors. A complaint had been made to the Disciplinary Board against two advocates and solicitors; the complaint was withdrawn against one of them, and a Disciplinary Committee was appointed. The second advocate and solicitor contended that the complaint had also been withdrawn against him, and when the Disciplinary Board declined to refer the matter to the Bar Council, an originating summons was filed seeking a remedy. The court approached the application through the statutory framework of the disciplinary process, sections 100, 103E and 103EA of the Legal Profession Act 1976, together with rules 8 and 18(3) of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2017, which lays down the internal avenues for the handling and review of complaints against members of the profession. The court held that the originating summons was an abuse of the process of the court because the internal avenue available under that framework had not been exhausted. The disciplinary machinery provided its own mechanism for dealing with the complaint and any grievance about how it was handled, and resort to the court by originating summons before those avenues were spent was premature and improper. The court accordingly declined to grant the relief sought. The court explained that permitting a party to bypass the statutory disciplinary process would undermine the scheme the Legislature had established for regulating the profession and would invite premature and fragmentary litigation over matters the Disciplinary Board and Bar Council are equipped to resolve. It emphasised that the availability of an internal remedy, not yet pursued to its conclusion, was decisive, and that the proper course was to exhaust that avenue before turning to the court. The judgment is a useful illustration of the requirement to exhaust the internal disciplinary avenues under the Legal Profession Act 1976 before invoking the court's jurisdiction, and of the court's treatment of a premature originating summons as an abuse of process.