1. ) Mohd Noor Amin Bin Mohd Noor Khan 2. ) XXXX 3. ) Mohamed Shihab Bin Kunhi Mohamed 4. ) Daljeet Singh A/l Kapur Singh v XXXX

w-02imncc-143-01-2024 Court of Appeal (Mahkamah Rayuan) 25 August 2025 • W-02(IM)(NCC)-143-01/2024 • 14 min read
3 cases cited (0 SG, 3 foreign)

Catchwords

Practice Areas

Judges (3)

Counsel (6)

Parties (5)

Case Significance

A useful statement of the approach to granting leave to execute a judgment more than six years old under Order 46 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012, and of appellate restraint in reviewing a first-instance court's exercise of that discretion.

This Court of Appeal decision concerns an appeal against the grant of leave to execute a judgment under Order 46 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012, which requires a party to obtain the court's leave before executing on a judgment that is more than six years old. The respondent had obtained a final judgment against the appellants in 2010 in connection with revolving project loan facilities, and had subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with them. Over the following years there had been extensive correspondence between the parties. When the respondent later sought leave to execute the 2010 judgment, the appellants resisted, arguing chiefly that the judgment had been superseded by the settlement agreement, so that it was the agreement, and not the judgment, that governed the parties' relationship, and that leave to execute the old judgment should not be granted. The High Court granted leave, and the appellants appealed. The Court of Appeal restated the principles applicable to the grant of leave to execute an aged judgment, including that an action on a judgment is subject to limitation, and was satisfied that the action on this judgment was not yet time-barred. It emphasised that where a discretion of this kind is conferred on a court of first instance, an appellate court will interfere only if the discretion was exercised injudiciously or on an erroneous view of the law. Finding that the High Court judge had correctly directed himself on the law and had given cogent reasons for granting leave — including in his treatment of the argument that the settlement agreement had displaced the judgment — the court held that there was no basis for appellate intervention. It accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs of RM10,000. The judgment is a useful statement of the approach to leave to execute a judgment more than six years old and of appellate restraint in reviewing a discretionary decision.

Summary

Four former directors of Ascendsys Sdn Bhd who had guaranteed its debt appealed against the High Court's grant of leave under Order 46 Rule 2 to Malaysia Debt Ventures Berhad to enforce a consent judgment more than six years after it was entered. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the High Court correctly exercised its discretion as the respondent had not been lackadaisical in enforcement, payments had been made intermittently, and the action was not yet barred by limitation.

What was the appellants' main argument against leave to execute?

The appellants argued that the 2010 judgment had been superseded by a settlement agreement entered into shortly afterwards, so that the agreement rather than the judgment governed the parties' relationship and leave to execute the old judgment should be refused.

Why did the Court of Appeal uphold the grant of leave?

The court held that an appellate court will interfere with a discretionary decision only if it was exercised injudiciously or on an erroneous view of the law. Finding that the judge had directed himself correctly, had given cogent reasons, and that the action on the judgment was not time-barred, it dismissed the appeal with costs of RM10,000.

Statutes Cited

Rules of Court 2012

Cases Cited (3)

MY (3)
[1981] 1 MLJ 227 [1996] 1 MLJ 165 [2020] 3 MLJ 692

Judgment

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Source: eJudgment (w-02imncc-143-01-2024)