HOW CHEE HONG v 1. ) KAN WENG HIN 2. ) MELVIN SELVAM A/L THAMBIRAJAH 3. ) YIP BENG FATT 4. ) LEMBAGA TATATERTIB PEGUAM BELA & PEGUAM CARA

Case Significance

Illustrates the courts' reluctance to intervene by declaration in professional disciplinary proceedings under the Legal Profession Act 1976 before the statutory process is complete, and confirms that a reconstituted Disciplinary Committee that commences its inquiry within one month of appointment complies with the Act.

This Court of Appeal decision concerns a challenge by an advocate and solicitor to the conduct of disciplinary proceedings brought against him under the Legal Profession Act 1976. The disciplinary matter arose from a complaint concerning the handling of a large judgment sum paid into a law firm's client account, and the Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board had appointed a Disciplinary Committee to inquire into the complaint. The appellant, who was the plaintiff below, filed an originating summons in the High Court seeking declarations that the Board's appointment of the Disciplinary Committee members was made out of time, that the time limits stipulated in the Act were mandatory, and that non-compliance rendered the proceedings invalid. The High Court declined to grant the declaratory relief, holding the originating summons to be premature, and this was the appeal.

The central question was whether the High Court judge's refusal to grant the declarations on the ground of prematurity was correct in law. The Court of Appeal examined the statutory scheme, including the requirement that a reconstituted Disciplinary Committee commence its inquiry within one month of its appointment and the six-year limitation provided in the Act. It found that the Disciplinary Board had acted within the limitation period, that the proviso to the limitation provision applied so that limitation was a non-starter, and that the reconstituted Disciplinary Committee had in fact commenced its inquiry within one month of appointment. The court also affirmed the general rule that a litigant must exhaust the statutory disciplinary mechanism before bringing his grievances to court, and explained that the Board had properly reconstituted the Committee where its earlier members could not sit.

Finding no appealable error in the High Court judge's decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed those findings and dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs. The judgment illustrates the courts' reluctance to intervene in professional disciplinary proceedings before the statutory process has run its course.