WABAG MUHIBBAH JV SDN BHD v USAHA SELALU SDN BHD

Case Significance

Applies section 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 to preclude a party from contradicting written documents (a debit note superseded by a later payment summary) and reaffirms the "plainly wrong" threshold for appellate interference; the defendant's appeal was dismissed.

This High Court (Johor Bahru) decision is a civil appeal from the Sessions Court, where the trial judge had allowed the plaintiff's claim against the defendant after a full trial. For convenience the appellant and respondent were referred to according to their positions in the Sessions Court, that is, the appellant as defendant and the respondent as plaintiff. Having examined the records of appeal, including the grounds of judgment prepared by the Sessions Judge, and having heard the submissions of counsel, the High Court dismissed the defendant's appeal with costs, following which the defendant filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The underlying dispute concerned the supply of heavy machinery, invoices and outstanding sums. The court applied the principle governing appellate intervention, namely that a trial judge's decision is to be disturbed only if it is "plainly wrong" or if there was insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. On the merits, the court addressed a debit note that had been accepted under protest, holding that no estoppel arose because the plaintiff had consistently disputed the defendant's computation. It attached weight to a Payment Summary dated 19 January 2019 issued by the defendant, which confirmed the outstanding debt and superseded the debit note, and which had never been cancelled.

On the evidence, the court held that section 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 precluded the defendant from contradicting the terms of the written documents, and that none of the provisos to section 92 applied, since the evidence the defendant sought to rely on would add a new term to the agreement, and no such term had been pleaded. Concluding that the Sessions Judge had taken the correct and sufficient approach in weighing the available evidence, the court found no basis to interfere and dismissed the appeal with costs. The judgment is a useful application of the parol-evidence rule under section 92 and of the "plainly wrong" threshold in a contract-and-invoice dispute.