1. ) AZRI-MALEK BIN WAN HARON 2. ) HISHAM RIZAL BIN WAN HASSAN v NUR HARTINI BINTI IBRAHIM

Case Significance

Illustrates removal of a personal representative for sufficient cause under section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959: an administrator who prefers her own and her family's interests over the beneficiaries she must serve may be removed to protect the estate.

This High Court decision at Shah Alam concerns an application to revoke the appointment of a co-administrator of a deceased's estate, and the "sufficient cause" that must be shown to remove a personal representative. The applicants sought, by originating summons under Order 71 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 and section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959, to set aside the appointment of the respondent as a co-administrator of the estate of a person who had died in November 2019. The letters of administration had been obtained by consent of the co-administrators and the beneficiaries, and only afterwards — following the issue of the certificate of inheritance (Sijil Faraidh) and after the consent to the appointment — did the respondent file an application to validate a purported gift (hibah) of the deceased. Because the parties are natural persons named only as litigants, this analysis refers to them by role.

The governing test was whether sufficient cause existed to justify removing the respondent as a personal representative, the burden lying on the applicants, and the paramount consideration being whether the interests of the beneficiaries of the estate were being preserved. Section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 empowers the court to revoke or amend a grant, and the concept of "sufficient cause" directs attention to conduct that undermines the due and impartial administration of the estate.

On the facts, the court found that the respondent was in a conflict of interest between her role as administrator and her own interests and those of her children, which she had clearly preferred over the welfare and interests of the other beneficiaries; her having sought to validate a gift in her own favour after consenting to the joint administration exemplified that conflict. Those matters, the court held, constituted sufficient cause warranting revocation of her appointment as co-administrator, alongside such consequential orders as were just for the beneficiaries. The judgment is a useful illustration of the removal of a personal representative for sufficient cause under section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959: an administrator who places her own interests, and those of her immediate family, above the beneficiaries she is bound to serve may be removed to protect the estate.