SARASWATHY SHIRKE DEO v 1. ) AMUTHA A/P AYAWOO 2. ) CHUNG TEK WEI 3. ) SHALEENEE A/P SUBRAMANIAM 4. ) LAM GHOOI KET PENCELAH AMADESA RESORT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
Catchwords
Reasons for this Court not to exercise its discretion [23] The Court is mindful that the trial in this matter had already been concluded after considerable time and resources were expended. In that context, the filing of this application at such a late stage - the judgment was delivered in July 2025 - and after parties had lodged their appeals at the Court of Appeal, this Court noted with some concern. This Court found it difficult to reconcile the lateness of this application despite the proposed intervener’s prior awareness of the proceedings, and that raised legitimate concerns relating to procedural fairness and finality. [24] At the forefront is as held in Sri Permata Sdn Bhd v PPH Realty Sdn Bhd (Lingkaran Cemerlang Sdn Bhd, Intended Intervenors) [2022] 1 MLJ 552 that maintained the cardinal principle that the power to grant leave to intervene is the court’s discretion. Then, this Court turns to Wan Salimah Bte Wan Jaffar v Mahmood Bin Omar (Anim Bte Abdul Aziz, Intervener) [1998] 5 MLJ 162 that explicitly upheld at p170: “It is a correct statement of the law to say that a person without legal but only a commercial interest cannot be allowed to intervene (Re Farbenindutrie [1944] Ch 41 (CA). In the same vein, Kerr LJ said in Sanders Load Co Inc v Entores Metal Brokers Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 857 to this effect (at p863): In my view, the rule requires some interest in the would-be intervener which us in some way directly related to the subject matter of the action. A mere commercial interest in its outcome, divorced from the subject matter of the action is not enough..” [25] Vide this application, the proposed intervener had failed to show that its legal right was impeded, disturbed, or affected. The orders were made as a result of the findings of facts in the case. The Plaintiff, not being a homeowner, was ordered to remove herself from the WhatsApp homeowner community/residential group chats, based on the historic events where inflammatory language was used by her that this Court found was defamatory on several occasions. This Court was of the considered view that the Plaintiff ought not to be on such community/residential communication platform because there was no legal need or any necessity especially so when the discord with the committee members of the earlier committee(s) was so bitter, such a platform ignited legal consequences (in the main case, it was defamation). The proposed intervener had not demonstrated to this Court how such orders affected it. Should it wish to re-employ the Plaintiff as its legal counsel, the orders do not bar so. Should it desire to communicate with the Plaintiff via WhatsApp chat communications, the orders do not ban such. Should its’ new committee want to discuss legal matters with the Plaintiff, the orders do not restrain such. See also Chong Fook Sin v. Amanah Raya Bhd & Ors [2010] 7 CLJ 917. [26] It had to be stated here that this Court is slightly puzzled as the orders are spent and academic. There was no stay in the execution of the orders. Thus, the Plaintiff had removed herself from the Amadesa Resort Condominium WhatsApp Homeowners community/residential communications. Yet, the proposed intervener failed to demonstrate how that had affected any of their legal rights (or even commercial for that matter - no demonstration of how its commercial rights were affected). The homeowners voted the committee members to execute duties relating to the affairs of their residence. Any legal matter arising was to be communicated by the committee members and the legal counsel, not directly by or with the homeowners. There are no breaches of any of the provisions of the SMA. Besides, the fact remained that the orders were complied with long before this application. [27] As to the submissions of the proposed interveners that the Defendants did not plead that the Plaintiff be removed from the WhatsApp community/residential group co
Practice Areas
Reasons for this Court not to exercise its discretion 23 The Court is mindful that the trial in this matter had already been concluded after considerable time and resources were expended. In that context, the filing of this application at such a late stage 24 At the forefront is as held in Sri Permata Sdn Bhd v PPH Realty Sdn Bhd (Lingkaran Cemerlang Sdn Bhd, Intended Intervenors) 2022 1 MLJ 552 that maintained the cardinal principle that the power to grant leave to intervene is the court’s discretion. Then, this Court turns to Wan Salimah Bte Wan Jaffar v Mahmood Bin Omar (Anim Bte Abdul Aziz, Intervener) 1998 5 MLJ 162 that explicitly upheld at p170: “It is a correct statement of the law to say that a person without legal but only a commercial interest cannot be allowed to intervene (Re Farbenindutrie 1944 Ch 41 (CA). In the same vein, Kerr LJ said in Sanders Load Co Inc v Entores Metal Brokers Ltd 1984 1 All ER 857 to this effect (at p863): In my view, the rule requires some interest in the would-be intervener which us in some way directly related to the subject matter of the action. A mere commercial interest in its outcome, divorced from the subject matter of the action is not enough..” 25 Vide this application, the proposed intervener had failed to show that its legal right was impeded, disturbed, or affected. The orders were made as a result of the findings of facts in the case. The Plaintiff, not being a homeowner, was ordered to remove herself from the WhatsApp homeowner community/residential group chats, based on the historic events where inflammatory language was used by her that this Court found was defamatory on several occasions. This Court was of the considered view that the Plaintiff ought not to be on such community/residential communication platform because there was no legal need or any necessity especially so when the discord with the committee members of the earlier committee(s) was so bitter, such a platform ignited legal consequences (in the main case, it was defamation). The proposed intervener had not demonstrated to this Court how such orders affected it. Should it wish to re-employ the Plaintiff as its legal counsel, the orders do not bar so. Should it desire to communicate with the Plaintiff via WhatsApp chat communications, the orders do not ban such. Should its’ new committee want to discuss legal matters with the Plaintiff, the orders do not restrain such. See also Chong Fook Sin v. Amanah Raya Bhd & Ors 2010 7 CLJ 917. 26 It had to be stated here that this Court is slightly puzzled as the orders are spent and academic. There was no stay in the execution of the orders. Thus, the Plaintiff had removed herself from the Amadesa Resort Condominium WhatsApp Homeowners community/residential communications. Yet, the proposed intervener failed to demonstrate how that had affected any of their legal rights (or even commercial for that matter 27 As to the submissions of the proposed interveners that the Defendants did not plead that the Plaintiff be removed from the WhatsApp community/residential group co
Judges (1)
Case Significance
SARASWATHY SHIRKE DEO v 1. ) AMUTHA A/P AYAWOO 2. ) CHUNG TEK WEI 3. ) SHALEE... is a High Court (Mahkamah Tinggi) decision dated November 5, 2025 (citation: wa-22ncvc-366-06-2022). The case was decided by Roz Mawar binti Rozain.
Key issues: [27] As to the submissions of the proposed interveners that the Defendants did not plead that the Plaintiff be removed from the WhatsApp community/residential group co.
What was the outcome of SARASWATHY SHIRKE DEO v 1. ) AMUTHA A/P AYAWOO 2. ) CHUNG TEK WEI 3. ) SHALEE...?
SARASWATHY SHIRKE DEO v 1. ) AMUTHA A/P AYAWOO 2. ) CHUNG TEK WEI 3. ) SHALEE... is a High Court decision dated November 5, 2025. The case was heard by Roz Mawar binti Rozain. See the full judgment for details.