1. ) BADAN PEGUAM MALAYSIA 2. ) KAREN CHEAH YEE LYNN 3. ) MOHAMAD EZRI BIN ABDUL WAHAB 4. ) ANAND RAJ A/L R. BALASUPRAMANIAM 5. ) MURSHIDAH BT MUSTAFA v 1. ) NOOR DELLHAN BIN YAHAYA (SELAKU PEGAWAI YANG MENJAGA DAERAH POLIS DANG WANGI) 2. ) NUZULAN BIN MOHD DIN 3. ) Polis Diraja Malaysia (PDRM) 4. ) Ketua Polis Negara 5. ) MENTERI DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA 6. ) Kerajaan Malaysia

Case Significance

Affirms that the police must facilitate rather than totally prohibit a peaceful assembly under the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012, while confirming that preventing a march is only a partial restriction of movement and does not constitute false imprisonment.

This High Court decision at Kuala Lumpur concerns a civil suit brought by the Malaysian Bar (Badan Peguam Malaysia) together with several of its office-bearers and members, arising from the prohibition of a peaceful march. The plaintiffs had organised an assembly and march on 17 June 2022, styled the "Walk for Judicial Independence", intending to proceed from the Padang Merbok Public Carpark to Parliament to deliver a memorandum to the then Prime Minister. The Officer-in-charge of the Dang Wangi Police District prohibited the march. The plaintiffs sued for breach of their rights under the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (Akta Perhimpunan Aman 2012) and the Federal Constitution, and in the torts of false imprisonment and misfeasance in public office.

The court held that the Officer-in-charge had acted ultra vires on 15 and 17 June 2022 in imposing a total prohibition on the march. It reasoned that the appropriate course was to facilitate the assembly by controlling traffic, preventing nuisance, and ensuring the safety of participants, rather than to forbid it outright, and that a total ban exceeded the conditions the officer could lawfully impose. However, the tortious claims failed. On false imprisonment the court applied the principle that the tort requires a total restraint of the person's liberty, and that a partial restriction of freedom of movement is not an imprisonment; the plaintiffs, being confined only in the sense of being prevented from marching, were not falsely imprisoned. On misfeasance in public office the court found that the officer's error stemmed from a misinterpretation of the law made without time to seek advice, which did not amount to the tort.

The court decided to issue a single declaration that the officer had acted ultra vires. It declined to award special damages, since the plaintiffs had achieved almost the whole object of the assembly apart from the march, and considered only nominal damages appropriate given the public-interest character of the case, ordering each party to bear its own costs. The judgment is a significant statement on the police duty to facilitate, rather than prohibit, peaceful assemblies.