MEGALA NATHAN A/L MARIAPPAN v Pendakwa Raya

n-09h-224-06-2022 Court of Appeal (Mahkamah Rayuan) 27 January 2025 • N-09(H)-224-06/2022 • 11 min read

8 cases cited (0 SG, 8 foreign)

Outcome

Conclusion [20] We are satisfied that there are no appealable errors that warrant our appellate intervention, and find that the conviction against the appellant is safe.

Quoted verbatim from the judgment of Court of Appeal (Mahkamah Rayuan) (n-09h-224-06-2022). Read the full judgment on the official Malaysia Courts portal for the complete decision.

Catchwords

Offence and Sentence: Section 12(2) DDA 1952, punishable under Section 39A(2) – 4 years' imprisonment, 4 strokes of whipping. Appeal Issue: Magistrate did not explicitly state presumption at the end of the prosecution’s case. Trial Judge’s Duty: Section 180 CPC – assess evidence, determine prima facie case, no requirement to state reasons or presumptions. Presumption of Possession: Magistrate invoked presumption but mentioned it only in final decision – legally permissible. Appellate Decision: No appealable error, conviction upheld, appeal dismissed. Conclusion: No appealable errors that warrant our appellate intervention - the conviction against the appellant is safe - appeal is therefore dismissed.

Practice Areas

Criminal Procedure

Judges (3)

Ahmad Zaidi bin Ibrahim Coram Mohamed Zaini bin Mazlan Delivered Mohd Nazlan bin Mohd Ghazali Coram

Counsel (6)

Paul, Amy Chong & Associates Firm Amy Chong Counsel Appellant Paul Krishnaraja Selladurai Counsel Appellant Syarifah Khairiah binti Syed Akmal Counsel Respondent Tengku Shahrizam bin Tuan Lah Counsel Respondent Virochean Stephan Soosai Counsel Appellant

Parties (2)

Pendakwa Raya Respondent Megala Nathan a/l Mariappan Appellant

Case Significance

Illustrates the operation of section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the prima facie stage: the trial court need not spell out whether it relies on a statutory presumption at the close of the prosecution case, provided its ultimate reasoning is clear and the conviction is otherwise safe.

This Court of Appeal decision concerns whether a trial court must expressly state, at the close of the prosecution's case, that it has invoked a statutory presumption before calling on the accused to enter a defence. The appellant had been charged in the Magistrates' Court under section 12(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, an offence punishable under section 39A(2), was convicted, and sentenced to four years' imprisonment from the date of conviction together with four strokes of whipping. His appeal to the High Court failed, and he appealed further. Because the appellant is a natural person named only as a party, this analysis refers to that party by role.

The ground of appeal was that the Magistrate had not explicitly stated, at the end of the prosecution's case, that a presumption had been invoked against the accused. The Court of Appeal rejected that ground. Under section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the trial court's task at the close of the prosecution case is to assess the evidence and determine whether a prima facie case has been made out; there is no requirement that the court articulate its reasons or announce which presumptions it has relied upon before calling for the defence. A magistrate who invokes the presumption of possession, but mentions it only in the final decision, does nothing legally impermissible.

The court distinguished the authorities relied on by the appellant — William John a/l Sandanasamy v PP and Imran Zakaria v PP — where the appeals had succeeded because it could not be conclusively determined from the judgments whether the trial court had relied on a presumption or on direct evidence at the close of the prosecution case. Here, no such uncertainty arose, and the court found no appealable error. Holding the conviction safe, it dismissed the appeal. The judgment is a useful illustration of the operation of section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the prima facie stage: the trial court need not spell out at that point whether it is relying on a presumption, provided its ultimate reasoning is clear and the conviction is otherwise safe.

Summary

Megalanathan appealed his conviction for possession of 16.13 grams of methamphetamine, arguing the Magistrate failed to explicitly state the presumption at the end of the prosecution's case. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the Magistrate was not required to inform the accused about the invocation of the presumption.

Must a trial court state at the close of the prosecution case that it has invoked a presumption?

No. Under section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code the court need only assess the evidence and determine whether a prima facie case exists; it is not required to state its reasons or announce which presumptions it relied on, and invoking the presumption of possession but mentioning it only in the final decision is legally permissible.

Why did the appeal fail?

Because the court found no appealable error: unlike the authorities the appellant cited, where it could not be determined whether the trial court relied on a presumption or direct evidence, here the reasoning was clear, so the conviction under section 12(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 was safe and the appeal was dismissed.