Pendakwa Raya v ONG YEW LUY

Case Significance

Illustrates that a defence supported by witnesses can raise a reasonable doubt on the element of possession, custody, control and knowledge, in a trafficking prosecution under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, thereby rebutting the statutory presumption of trafficking and leading to an acquittal at the close of the defence.

This High Court decision concerns a trafficking prosecution under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 in which the accused was acquitted at the close of the defence case after raising a reasonable doubt on possession. The accused was charged with trafficking in 741.9 grams of methamphetamine, said to have been found at a house. At the close of the prosecution case the court found that a prima facie case had been established and called on the accused to enter his defence. The accused gave sworn evidence and called two witnesses, his wife, who had also been detained on the day of the incident but was not charged, and a friend. The prosecution case was that, on entering the rear of the house, the raiding officer found the accused alone and that the accused handed over a plastic bag containing the drugs. The court examined that account against the defence evidence and found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had in fact held and handed over the yellow plastic bag containing the drugs to the officer. Concluding that the defence had raised a reasonable doubt on the element of possession, being custody, control and knowledge of the drugs, the court held that the accused had thereby also rebutted the presumption of trafficking. It found that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and ordered the accused discharged and acquitted (dilepas dan dibebaskan) of the charge under section 39B(1)(a). The prosecution appealed against the acquittal. The judgment is a useful illustration of how a defence, supported by witnesses, can raise a reasonable doubt on the crucial element of possession and, in doing so, displace the statutory presumption of trafficking even where a prima facie case was found at the close of the prosecution case.