Pendakwa Raya v 1. ) TENG WEI XIONG 2. ) CHAI YING

Case Significance

A companion joint drug-trial decision illustrating that affirmative proof of possession under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 activates the section 37(da) trafficking presumption, and that the court must still fairly weigh even a weak defence for reasonable possibility of truth.

This High Court decision at Johor Bahru, part of a joint criminal trial of two accused on multiple drug charges, concerns the proof of possession and the judicial duty to evaluate the defence. The Public Prosecutor (Pendakwa Raya) charged the two accused jointly with trafficking in methamphetamine of some 75.79 grams under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, and with further charges relating to cannabis under section 6, MDMA and ketamine under section 12(2), and the poison etizolam under section 9(1) of the Poisons Act 1952. Because the accused are natural persons named only as parties, this analysis refers to them by role and ordinal position.

The prosecution relied on a web of connecting evidence linking the accused to the room in which the drugs were kept: the two were seen walking out of the house; a padlock key to the small gate was recovered from the second accused's bag; the main front door was opened using the first accused's right index fingerprint; and the room door was opened using a PIN combination by the first accused, the drugs being found in a drawer, a cupboard and under the bed within the room. On that evidence the court held that possession had been affirmatively established and that the presumption of trafficking under section 37(da) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 applied, so that a prima facie case was made out and the defence was called.

The court then addressed how the defence — including the contention that the first accused had gone to the house for the first time and neither stayed overnight nor resided in the room — was to be assessed. It restated that a trial judge must not dismiss even a weak defence simply because the prosecution witnesses are believed; where the accused gives an explanation consistent with innocence, the court must consider whether it might reasonably be true, even without being convinced of it, applying Mat v PP and Mohamad Radhi. The judgment is a useful illustration of the way affirmative proof of possession activates the statutory trafficking presumption, and of the enduring obligation on the court to weigh the defence fairly before reaching a verdict.