Pendakwa Raya v AKMAL HAKIM BIN HADI MUNIR
Outcome
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. The decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge dated 7.11.2024 acquitting and discharging the Respondent, Akmal Hakim bin Hadi Munir, of the charge under Section 14(a) of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 read together with Section 16(1) of the same Act is hereby affirmed and upheld.
Catchwords
Practice Areas
Judges (1)
Counsel (5)
Case Significance
Instructive on the prudence rule for convicting on the uncorroborated testimony of a child under the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 and the Evidence Act 1950, and on the narrow scope for an appellate court to reverse a trial court's acquittal.
This High Court decision at Johor Bahru concerns an appeal by the Public Prosecutor against an acquittal in a child sexual offence prosecution. The accused, a schoolteacher, had been charged under section 14(a) of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 read with section 16(1) of the same Act, on an allegation of physical sexual assault of a child pupil during a school examination, and the Sessions Court had acquitted and discharged him at the close of the defence case. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the trial judge had erred in the assessment of the evidence. The judgment is a careful treatment of the principles governing conviction on the evidence of a child witness and of appellate intervention in findings of fact. The court examined whether a conviction could rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a child, the requirement that such testimony be scrutinised with prudence and be, in effect, unusually convincing, and whether a first complaint to a parent could amount to corroboration under sections 157 and 8 of the Evidence Act 1950, noting the significance of the mother's subsequent withdrawal of the complaint. It also considered whether an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act arose from the failure to record statements from the roughly twenty other students present, distinguishing between evidence merely not obtained and evidence withheld or suppressed. Weighing the material inconsistencies in the child's evidence, the withdrawal of the complaint, the absence of any supporting evidence from the many others present, and the plausibility of the defence in the context of COVID-19 protocols, the court held that a reasonable doubt had been raised and that the benefit of that doubt belonged to the accused. Applying the settled rule that an appellate court should not interfere with a trial court's findings of fact and credibility unless plainly wrong or perverse, the court, per Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad J, found no such error, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the acquittal. The judgment is instructive on the standard for convicting on child testimony and on the narrow scope for appellate reversal of an acquittal.
Why was the prosecution's appeal against the acquittal dismissed?
The court found that material inconsistencies in the child's evidence, the mother's withdrawal of the complaint, the absence of supporting evidence from the many other students present, and the plausibility of the defence together raised a reasonable doubt, and that the trial judge's findings were not plainly wrong or perverse; the appeal was therefore dismissed and the acquittal affirmed.
What principles governed the use of the child's testimony?
The court considered whether a conviction could rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a child, the requirement to scrutinise such evidence with prudence so that it is unusually convincing, whether a first complaint to a parent corroborates under sections 157 and 8 of the Evidence Act 1950, and whether an adverse inference under section 114(g) arose from evidence not obtained as opposed to evidence suppressed.
Statutes Cited
Cases Cited (12)
Judgment
Read the full judgment on the official Malaysia Courts portal.
Read on eJudgmentSource: eJudgment (ja-42jsklba-2-11-2024)