NUR SYAFIQ BIN ZAKARIA v Pendakwa Raya

Case Significance

Confirms that an appellate court will not disturb a sentence unless it is manifestly inadequate, grossly excessive, illegal or the product of an error in principle, and upholds a repeat-offender drug sentence of five years' imprisonment, caning and supervision fixed to run from the date of sentence.

This High Court decision at Kota Bharu concerns an appeal against the sentence imposed on an accused for self-administration of dangerous drugs as a repeat offender. The accused had pleaded guilty in the Sessions Court to a charge under section 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, punishable under section 39C(1) because he had two previous convictions under section 15(1)(a), of giving to himself amphetamine and methamphetamine. The Sessions Court had sentenced him to five years' imprisonment, to run from the date he was charged, together with one stroke of the cane and a two-year supervision order to take effect after the term of imprisonment. On the appeal against sentence, the Court restated the settled principle that an appellate court will not alter a sentence unless it is manifestly inadequate, grossly excessive, illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts, or unless the lower court has clearly erred in applying the correct principles, and that it will not interfere merely because it might itself have passed a different sentence. Examining the sentence, the Court found that the Sessions Court judge had imposed the lightest sentence permitted by law upon the accused, which reflected that the judge had taken into account the mitigating factors advanced on his behalf. As to the exercise of discretion in fixing when the sentence was to commence, the Court agreed with the Sessions Court's decision to order the imprisonment to run from the date of sentence rather than the date of arrest. Finding no error in either the length of the sentence or its commencement, the Court declined to disturb the sentence. The decision reflects the deference an appellate court accords to a sentencing court that has properly weighed the facts and mitigation, and confirms that the choice of the commencement date of a term of imprisonment is a matter within the sentencing court's discretion, which will not be interfered with where it has been exercised on a proper basis, here from the date of sentence rather than the date of arrest.