MUHAMMAD FAIZAL BIN MOHAMMAD MAZLAN v Pendakwa Raya

Case Significance

Illustrates the High Court's use of its criminal revisionary power under section 316 of the Criminal Procedure Code to correct a defective charge under the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017, and the boundary between the revisionary and appellate procedures.

This High Court matter is an exercise of the court's criminal revisionary jurisdiction over a charge framed under section 14(a) of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 ("Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017", Act 792). The proceedings began as a "semakan jenayah" (criminal revision) directed at the propriety of the charge, met at the threshold by a "bantahan awal" (preliminary objection) to the revision application itself. The central complaint was that the charge was defective: the offence, as framed, was said to be one that "tidak wujud di sisi undang-undang" (does not exist in law), the question turning on whether the physical act alleged fell within the conduct the Act criminalises, given the contention that the Act reaches physical acts of a defined kind. The record also puts in issue the supporting material, contrasting a "koyakan baru" (a fresh tear) with a "koyakan lama" (an old tear) of the hymen as reflected in the police report and the medical report. A further strand concerns the plea taken in the lower court, and whether a "pengakuan bersyarat" (a conditional plea of guilt) was validly recorded where the accused may not have understood the consequences of pleading guilty. The court also confronted a procedural question of general importance, namely whether revision may be used in place of an appeal, so as to avoid a duplicity of procedure, and whether the exceptional circumstances required to invoke the revisionary power under section 316 of the Criminal Procedure Code were present. On the outcome recorded, the High Court set aside ("mengenepikan") the decision of the trial court and remitted the matter back to the Sessions Court. In substance the revision engaged both the legal sufficiency of the charge and the fairness of the plea process, the two grounds on which the High Court considered a Sessions Court order could properly be disturbed on revision rather than left to the ordinary appeal. The judgment is significant for its treatment of a defective charge under Act 792 and for the boundary it draws between the revisionary and the appellate procedures.