MUHAMAD TAUFIQ BIN ABDOLL HAMID v Pendakwa Raya

Case Significance

Illustrates the limited power of an appellate court to interfere with a trial court's findings of fact on custody, control and knowledge in a drug-possession case, and the approach to a bare-denial defence and to a complaint that a sentence under section 39A(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 is manifestly excessive.

This High Court decision, exercising appellate jurisdiction, concerns an appeal against conviction and sentence for drug possession by a member of the Royal Malaysia Police. The appellant had been convicted by the Sessions Court of possession of cannabis, an offence under section 6 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 punishable under section 39A(2), and appealed on the footing that the conviction was unsafe and the sentence manifestly excessive. The catchwords record that the prosecution had established a prima facie case, resting on the custody and control of the seized drugs, the chemist's report, and the chain of evidence showing that the impugned drugs had been within the appellant's grasp, and that the defence, which amounted to a bare denial, had failed to raise a reasonable doubt or to displace the finding of knowledge of the presence of the drugs. On appeal the court considered its power to interfere with and correct the findings of the trial court, the reliability of the witnesses and any inconsistencies in their evidence, and whether the defence was a mere afterthought. It held that the Sessions Court's findings were correct and, weighing the seriousness of the offence, the public interest and the trend of sentencing for like offences, that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. The court accordingly declined to disturb the conviction or the sentence and dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the Sessions Court. The court's approach shows that an appellate court will not lightly substitute its own view for the trial court's assessment of witnesses who were seen and heard, and will interfere only where the findings are shown to be plainly wrong; a bare denial unsupported by any evidence capable of displacing proof of custody, control and knowledge does not raise the reasonable doubt an accused must show once a prima facie case has been made out. The judgment illustrates the appellate court's limited power to interfere with a trial court's findings of fact on possession and knowledge, and the treatment of a bare-denial defence and a complaint that a sentence is manifestly excessive.